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CORRESPONDENCE 
MUTUALITY OF ESTOPPEL: 
A QUESTION 
To the Editors: 
A recent Note, "A Probabilistic Analysis of the Doctrine of 
Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel, " 1 made excellent use of elemen-
tary probability theory to demonstrate the extent to which relax-
ation of the mutuality requirement will increase the damages 
suffered by a defendant subject to multiple suits in which there 
is common issue (or correspondingly, will decrease the total re-
covery of a plaintiff who has several suits litigating a common 
issue against different defendants). Although the author made a 
number of useful points concerning the case law and the argu-
ments advanced by proponents on each side of the controversy, 
the central thesis of the Note was an argument for retaining the 
mutuality requirement based on this difference in the anticipated 
losses of a given defendant. In effect, this thesis takes the distri-
bution of risks given a mutuality of estoppel rule as presump-
tively correct, thus evading the principal issue. The issue really 
is the estimate of damages upon which the prospective partici-
pant in a litigation should be made to act. 
Consider, for example, a particular type of case that often 
entails multiple suits involving a common issue: product liability 
suits. Suppose "the Company" manufactures a product with a 
putative defect. Assume this putative defect could be "remedied" 
at a cost of S dollars, reducing injuries from the use of the product 
by R dollars. Assume, further, that it is desirable to attempt to 
assure that the "defect" is remedied if and only if S is less than 
R.2 The Company, however, will make its decision whether to 
remedy the defect on the basis of a different comparison: The cost 
1. 76 MtCH. L. REV. 612 (1978). 
2. This assumption concerning the goal of tort law is made for convenience of exposi-
tion, and is not intended to be a denial of the validity of other goals or concerns of tort. 
law. In particular, a decision not to remedy a defect where the avoidance cost is only 
slightly higher than the accident cost, although justified under the assumption above, will 
result in the transfer of wealth from plaintiffs to attorneys and other intermediaries if the 
defendant's litigation costs are set equal to the plaintiffs accident costs. Whether this 
redistribution of wealth is acceptable depends upon what classes the plaintiffs are likely 
to be from as well as upon who the determining agency is. 
1355 
1356 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 77:1355 
of remedying, S, against the Company's expected litigation cost, 
L. But L depends upon the rules respecting collateral estoppel, 
as the Note demonstrated, since - if strict liability law is not 
applicable - each suit by a plaintiff against the Company will 
entail a common issue of whether the defect should have been 
remedied, in addition to separate issues of the causal relation of 
the alleged defect to the injury. As the Note showed, given the 
existence of a mutuality of estoppel restriction, the Company's 
expected litigation cost, Lm,' is less than its expected litigation 
cost in the absence of such limitation on collateral estoppel, L0 • 
If Lm <Lo<R, it would be preferable to impose a mutuality re-
striction on collateral estoppel in order to reduce the incidence of 
occasions on which the Company would make the decision that 
society does not wish it to make. The Company will wrongly 
decide not to remedy the defect only when S is more than the 
litigation cost L but less than the real cost R. When Lm<L0 <R, 
forcing the company to use L~- rather than Lm reduces the size 
of that zone of error. Thus, whenever the Company would de-
cide wrongly by considering its litigation costs on the basis of no 
mutuality restriction on collateral estoppel (that is, whenever S 
is between Rand ~ 0 ), Swill also be between Rand Lm, so the 
Company would also have made the wrong decision if it had 
acted on the assumption that there was a mutuality restriction 
upon collateral estoppel. On the other hand, whenever S is 
between L,m and L0 , the Company would decide correctly if it 
assumed there was no mutuality restriction but would decide 
incorrectly if it assumed there was a mutuality restriction. 
Thus the critical question is whether it is more reasonable to 
anticipate that for this category of cases R will be greater than 
L0 , in which event there should not be a mutuality restriction on 
collateral estoppel, or that R will be less than Lm, in which event 
there should be a mutuality restriction. (If R is between the two 
estimates of litigation cost, the question turns upon which esti-
mate of litigation cost is "closer" to R in a sense which depends 
on the probability distribution of safety costs and is beyond the 
scope of a letter.) 
Further analysis indicates that in general R will be greater 
than L0 • If 
C is the collection of all cases c that might be brought alleging 
injury as a result of the defect, 
D(c) is the damages suffered in case c, and 
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P(c) is the probability that the evidence that could be presented 
in case c indicates the needed causal relation between defect and 
injury, 
then the true cost of not remedying the defect is 
R = L D(c) x P(c). 
cEC 
At the same time, if 
D'(c} is the damage award that a jury would give in a case present-
ing the evidence available in case c, were it to decide for the plain-
tiff, 
J(c) is the probability that the issue of causation will be decided 
in favor of the plaintiff in any given case, and 
p is the probability that the issue of liability for failure to remedy 
the defect will be decided in favor of the plaintiff in any given case, 
and if p is independent of the other two variables, then the 
expected litigation cost given a mutuality restriction under 
collateral estoppel is 
Lm = L p x D'(c) x J(c), 
cEC 
which can be rewritten as 
Lm = pxT 
where T is the anticipated cost of litigation if the issue of liabil~ 
ity for failure to remedy the defect were foreclosed against the 
defendant ab initio. 
In these terms, the Note demonstrated that the expected 
litigation cost on the assumption that there is no mutuality re-
striction on collateral estoppel would be Lo = k x T, where k is 
less than one but larger than p. Where there are numerous suits, 
k is exceedingly close to one. 
Thus, it would be sufficient to know that T is less than -
or not much more than - R.3 But if jury awards are approxi-
mately equal to actual damages and if juries decide the causa-
tion issue in favor of plaintiffs approximately as often as the 
plaintiffs are in fact correct in their assertion, then T is less than 
3. The critical situation is where the outcome of the "defect" question is not substan-
tially certain. If the probability of plaintiff winning the defect issue is nearly 100%, the 
collateral estoppel rule is essentially irrelevant since the difference between the two esti-
mates of litigation cost are very small. But if the chance of any given plaintiff succeeding 
on the "defect" issue is, say, 50% then Lm is only 1h of T, so L0 is a better estimate of 
R even if T were, say, 20% higher than R. 
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R, since those assumptions imply that T differs from R only in-
sofar as there are sonie injuries upon which no suit is brought. 4 
To dispute the conclusion that T is less than or equal to R, 
and hence to dispute the conclusion that the probability analysis 
favors no mutuality restriction upon collateral estoppel in this 
category of cases, it is necessary to show either that the damages 
awarded by juries in this category of lawsuits are significantly 
higher than real damages or that juries favor plaintiffs too often 
on the causation issue. Although such contentions have been 
made, based on the award of "pain and suffering" and on as-
sumptions about jury behavior in regard to insurance coverage, 
none of those arguments have indicated that the average cost of 
a litigated suit includes a sufficient "premium" to overcome the 
underestimation resulting from situations where the plaintiff's 
chance of winning on the "defect" issue is significantly less than 
100%. Accordingly, the probability analysis of the Note is 
actually favorable to arguments for elimination of the mutuality 
restriction on collateral estoppel with respect to this category 
of cases rather than being favorable to arguments for retention 
of the restriction. 
Reply: 
Stephen Millman 
New York, New York 
Mr. Millman makes two points in his letter: first, that my 
thesis is based upon the presumptive validity of the distribution 
of outcomes under the doctrine of mutuality of collateral estoppel 
and thus assumes its conclusion, and second, that my own analy-
sis argues for the abandonment of mutuality (a point that is 
illustrated by the long example in his letter). I disagree on both 
counts. 
My appeal for the retention of the mutuality requirement is 
made on two levels. First, there is an appeal to common sense: It 
is not sensible that a litigant's likelihood of success on the issue 
of his negligence should depend on the number of persons injured 
as a result of that alleged negligence. When trying the issue of a 
bus driver's negligence we would not (under any normal set of 
4. This assumes that the marginal legal fees and court costs of the defendant are 
small in relation to the expected damage awards. One reason for not using strict liability 
may be the possibility that T is, in fact, somewhat greater than R. As indicated in note 
3 supra, however, the "premium" included in T over R would have to be extremely large 
for the mutuality restriction to be preferable. 
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circumstances) consider it probative that there were fifteen 
rather than four people on the bus and would not admit into 
evidence testimony to that effect. It is equally ridiculous that our 
procedure should embody a presumption to that effect. 
By demonstrating that, when the mutuality requirement is 
abandoned, a party's average chances for success on any and 
every issue vary with the number of his opponents, I hoped to 
show that mutuality makes sense. My assumption was only that 
the number of parties on a given side of an issue is generally 
irrelevant to the question of which view of the facts is correct, an 
assumption that appears so self-evident that stating it explicitly 
sounds absurd. 
My second approach was to look to the internal consistency 
and coherency of legal procedure. My assumption in the second 
instance was that judicial fact finding is the proper subject of 
decision analysis - that a trial is a situation, like any other in 
which human beings confront choice, where facts may be known 
with a greater or lesser degree of certainty and where different 
outcomes are assigned a greater or lesser degree of desirability. 
I then went on to show that the conventional statement of the 
burden of persuasion embodies certain assumptions about the 
relative value of different outcomes and that the abandonment of 
mutuality is inconsistent with those values. If I take anything as 
presumptively correct, it is not mutuality but the burden of per-
suasion. Even there, however, I think it can be argued (and was 
argued in the text at notes 29-33) that the burden of persuasion 
is more than presumptively correct: a general statement of the 
appropriate standard of certainty, without regard to the facts of 
any case, in a system whose stated goal is fair compensation must 
necessarily be that the finder of fact must find that which is more 
likely than not. 
As for Mr. Millman's example, although it is not so stated, 
his essential premise is that the issue of negligence (i.e., whether 
a defect "should have been remedied") should not be tried at all. 
(His mathematics shows that, given his stated premises, the out-
come is wrong unless the defendant loses on this issue 100% of the 
time.) By aligning the issues and parties in his example so that 
the abandonment of mutuality tends to result in the preclusion 
of the negligence issue, he thus makes it appear that the aban-
donment of mutuality is generally appropriate. 
Mr. Millman's example can readily be refuted by setting up 
a slightly different set of facts: A consumer is injured by taking a 
medication produced by several manufacturers. Each manufac-
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turer's version of the drug suffers from the same defect. In sepa-
rate lawsuits against each manufacturer, the consumer must es-
tablish that the defect should have been cured. If there is no 
mutuality requirement, it is much less likely that the consumer 
will, on average, succeed on this issue. Thus, in my example 
(given Mr. Millman's assumptions about the desirable distribu-
tion of outcomes), mutuality leads to better results. The point is 
not, however, that in some cases mutuality is desirable and in 
other cases it is not. The lack of mutuality only results in a better 
outcome if it results in preclusion of an issue that should not be 
tried in the first instance. 
The legal solution responsive to Mr. Millman's problem 
(given his premise that strict liability results in a better distribu-
tion of outcomes) is simply to avoid the issue of negligence by 
imposing strict liability. To abandon mutuality, which is by itself 
a neutral principle, is not an appropriate response. 
David Gruber 
New York, New York 
